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Monetary Policy in a Deregulated World
Recently, the traditional relationshipbetween
the M1 monetary aggregate and the economy
appears to have broken down. Some economists
argue that the partial deposit rate deregulation of
M1, which eliminated interest ceilings on per-
sonal checking accounts, has made the aggre-
gate behave more like other interest paying
financial assets and less like money. Ifthis pro-
cess of deregulation were carried to its logical
conclusion - with both depositrate ceilings
and reserve requirements eliminated - it is con-
ceivable that virtually all financial assets could
become checkable, thereby rendering useless
the traditional definition of money. Conse-
quently, monetary policy would have to focus
on something other than the quantity of assets
that can be used as media ofexchange.
Such a world may not be as far off as might first
appear. Some brokerage firms now offer "cash
management accounts" that enable investors to
write checks on a wide variety of assets. More-
over, there have been several legislative pro-
posals to pay a market rate of interest on
reserves, which essentially would eliminate their
association with money. This Letter considers
how money could be controlled in a completely
deregulated world in which all deposits were
free of both interest ceilings and reserve require-
ments, and assesses the resulting effects on eco-
nomic efficiency and price stability.
Allocative efficiency
The traditional argument for deregulation of
deposit rates and reserve requirements is that it
would increase allocative efficiency, that is, it
would allow depositories to provide services
that more closely matched their customers' pref-
erences at lower costs.
Currently, banks, thrifts and other depository
institutions (hereafter, "banks") are required to
hold reserves against deposit accounts that offer
unlimited checking privileges and on some other
types of accounts as well. Reserves are held
either as vault cash or as noninterest-bearing
deposits at the Federal Reserve.
The foregone interest on required reserves is
similar to a tax on bank-provided financial inter-
mediation (that is, the bringing together of bor-
rowers and lenders). This tax is partly reflected
in lower interest rates on reservable (mainly
transactions) deposits and perhaps partly in
higher rates on bank loans. As a result, the
reserve tax distorts decisions regarding the
allocation offunds between deposits and non-
deposit assets. It induces the public to hold more
savings-type and fewer transactions-type
deposits than otherwise because of the higher
reserve tax on transactions deposits. And, it
induces them to hold more funds in nondeposi-
tory financial instruments, such as money mar-
ket mutual funds, which are not reservable. This
shift offunds out of banks in turn reduces the
amount of financial intermediation services per-
formed by banks.
Paying a market rate of interest on reserves or
eliminating reserve requirements in conjunction
with eliminating all prohibitions against paying
interest on deposits would free the resources
now employed in trying to minimize the burden
of these regulations. Moreover, the public also
would benefit because the allocation of its port-
folios between transactions and nontransactions
balances would be based on economic, not reg-
ulatory, considerations, and because the amount
ofbank-provided financial intermediation ser-
vices would increase. Although there is wide-
spread agreement that these effects would be
beneficial, there is concern about the implica-
tions for monetary control and, hence, price
stability.
Monetary control in the current system
Currently, the Federal Reserve has the power to
influence the quantity oftransaction deposits by
varying either (1) reserve requirements - that is,
the fraction of deposits that must be held as
reserves or (2) the total quantity of reserves out-
standing (changed primarily through open mar-
ket operations). For example, by selling a
Treasury security to the public, the Federal
Reserve can contract the quantity of reserves.
As long as reserves pay no interest, banks have
an incentive to hold very few reserves in excess
ofwhat is required. Thus, increases in reserves
will translate into a multiple expansion ofreserv"
able deposits as banks attempt to rid themselves
of excess reserves by using them to purchase
additional interest-earning assets (e.g., to make
loans).FRBSF
Monetary control with interest on reserves
In contrast,ifa market rate of interest, such as
the rate on u.s. Treasury securities, were paid
on reserves, and check clearing and wire trans-
fers were priced at their marginal costs, the
Federal Reserve would no longer have the
power to affect the quantity of reservable
deposits directly. Banks would have little incen-
tive to minimizetheir reserve holdings as they
do now because reserves would become a per-
fect substitute for Treasury securities, which they
voluntarily hold. (Banks currently voluntarily
holdabout 15 percentoftheir assets in Treasury
securities.)
Thus, if the Federal Reserve increased the quan-
tity of reserves, banks simply would reduce the
quantity ofTreasury securities voluntarily held
because they would continue to earn compar-
able interest onthe new reserves. Since there
would be no overall change in the quantity of
banks' assets earning the Treasury security rate,
only in the distribution of those assets between
Treasury securities and reserves, the quantity of
deposits would be unaffected:
In sum, with a marketrate of interest paid on all
reserves, neither open market operations nor
changes in reserve requirements would have a
directeffecton total reservable deposits. Ifthe
Federal Reserve just eliminated reserve require-
ments and paid a market rate ofinterest on vol-
untarily held reserves, the resultwouldbe
similar.
Deposits outofcontrol?
In a world in which the link between reserve
requirements on transactions deposits and the
quantity oftransactions deposits was broken,
whatwould.determine the quantity of such
deposits? The answer is the benefits and costs of
bank-provided financial intermediation.
Deposits, as distinct fromgovernment CLJrrency,
are a form of.bankdebt, and the quantity of
transactions deposits would be determined in a
manner similar to the way the quantity of other
types ofdebt is determined.
In a competitive unregulated world, transactions
deposits would pay a rate of interest determined
by the market and transactions themselves (for
example, check clearing) would be priced at
their marginal cost. Since transactions deposits
would pay interest, they would be issued only if
the interest could be offset by the earnings on
the assets in which they were invested.
Stability of prices
Some analysts are concerned that, with the
quantity oftransactions deposits outside the
Federal Reserve's control, the Federal Reserve
would be powerless to stabilize prices because it
could no longer directly influence the quantity
oftransactions deposits and hence the quantity
of money as traditionally defined.
However, according to one strand of contempo-
rary monetary theory, which perhaps has been
most clearly explicated by economist Eugene
Fama, changes in the quantity oftransactions
deposits or other forms of debt would not
directly affect the price level in an unregulated
reserve-free system. According to this
theory,the reason is that the price level is deter-
mined by the supply of and demand for govern-
ment-issued money only. In the U.s., govern-
ment-issued money currently consists of all pub-
licly held currency and bank reserves, and is
known as the monetary base or high-powered
money. Thus, this theory views the supply of
and demand for the monetary base as determin-
ing the price level. .
In our current system, according to this theory,
the quantity oftransaction deposits affects prices
not because the deposits are money as conven-
tionallythought, but because reserve require-
ments directly Iinkthe demand for the deposits
with the monetary base. That is, changes in the
demand for transactions deposits change banks'
demand for reserves as dictated by reserve
requirements. It is this change in the demand for
reserves (which are part ofthe monetary base)
relative to thesupply - notthe change in the
quantity of deposits themselves-that affects
the price level. Accordingly, eliminating reserve
requirements (while still paying interest on vol-
untarily held reserves), or equivalently, paying
interest on all reserves, would sever the link
between deposits and the monetary base and
thereby eliminate the effects ofdeposit changes
on the price level. In addition, with interestpaid
on reserves, reserves would no longer be part of
the base since they would be a type ofdebt-
not money in the strict sense.
Some have argued that without reserve require-
ments (and with interest paid on voluntarily heldreserves), there would be no demand for base
money (i.e., currency) and that, as a result, the
price level would increase without limit.
However, there almost certainly would still be a
demand for government currency for conve-
nience reasons at least. It is simply too costly to
use checks or credit cards for all transactions,
particularly small transactions. Consequently,
the public would continue to demand currency
even though checking deposits paid a market
rate of interest and were unregulated. In fact,
approximately 80 percent ofthe base now con-
sists of currency held by the public and only 20
percent of currency and Federal Reserve
deposits held by banks. Thus, at most, reserve
requirements account for 20 percent ofthe
demand for base money.
Although there wou.ld be a demand for currency
and hence a finite price level in such a system,
the question remains of whether the price level
would be stable. The stability of prices in a
reserve-free system would depend in part on the
stability of the demand for currency. However, it
seems unlikelythat eliminating reserve require-
ments would cause the demand for currency to
become more unstable than the demand for cur-
rency and reserves is now (although the elimina-
tion of reserve requirements would cause a one-
time decline in the level of demand). And, if
deposit rate deregulation has caused the
demand for checkable deposits to become un-
stable, eliminating reserve requirements might
actually increase the stability ofthe demand for
the base by severing the link between the
demand for deposits and the demand for the
monetary base.
Even if the demand for currency were unstable,
the price level need not be unstable if the
Federal Reserve could detect and accommodate
changes in demand by varying the quantity of
currency. Eliminating reserve requirements
would not lessen the ability of the Federal
Reserve to detect changes in money demand.
Nor would there be any technical difficulties in
controlling the quantity of currency, although
the quantity oftransactions deposits and the
degree offinancial intermediationwould not be
directly controllable. As Famahas pointed out,
monetary control and the control ofthe degree
of bank-provided intermediation services would
be separated. Moreover, this separation might
lower the economic costs of controlling prices
by making it possible to reduce the quantity of
money without directly restricting bank credit.
Inflation and financial intermediation
In our current monetary system, there is a short-
run tradeoff between reducing inflation and the
degree of financial intermediation because when
the Federal Reserve wishes to slow inflation, it
contracts the growth rate of reserves. While this
reduces the growth ofthe monetary base and
hence tends to reduce inflation, it also leads to
contraction of transactions deposits and hence
reduces bank intermediation services. Because
the decline in transactions deposits cannot be
completely offset by increases in other types of
deposits, bank loans also decline. The result is a
reduction of real economic activity because
other sources of credit cannot be substituted for
bank loans, at least in the short-run. Thus, the
Fed cannot both increase bank credit (and finan-
cial intermediation) and keep inflation in check.
With a reserve-free monetary system, the Federal
Reserve could reduce the growth of currency
through open market sales of Treasury securities
to the public (for which it pays in currency) and
hence reduce inflation without directly affecting
bank reserves, deposits, loans or the degree of
financial intermediation. Moreover, in a reserve-
free system the Federal Reserve, if itwished,
could still target base money, the price level, or
nominal GNP.
Many economists argue that monetary policy
has real effects on the economy in addition to its
effects on the degree of financial intermediation.
If true, changes in base money would still have
these real effects even in a reserve-free system
and hence might indirectly affect financial inter-
mediation. Hut under a reserve-free system,
financial intermediation would notbe singled
out to be directly affected by monetary policy as
it is now. A reserve-free system, or one in which
interest was paid on reserves, in addition to
increasing allocative efficiency, might therefore
lessen the adverse short-run real effects ofcon-
tractionary monetary policy.
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Loans, Leases and Investmentsl 2 199,679 272 4,600 2.3
Loans and Leases1 6 181,875 192 5,306 3.0
Commercial and Industrial 50,796 - 193 - 904 - 1.7
Real estate 66,964 63 3,022 4.7
Loans to Individuals 39,508 186 2,905 7.9
Leases 5,510 - 6 113 2.0
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 10,365 25 - 1,266 -10.8
OtherSecurities2 7,439 56 559 8.1
Total Deposits 204,023 1,321 4,663 2.3
Demand Deposits 51,042 1,494 2,666 5.5
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 35,016 - 90 3,658 11.6
OtherTransaction Balances4 16,294 - 34 2,457 17.7
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 136,687 - 140 - 459 - 0.3
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 46,948 63 1,980 4.4
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 ormore 35,245 - 129 - 2,551 - 6.7
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 22,934 - 141 - 904 - 3.7
Two WeekAverages
ofDaily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes u.s. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephonetransfers
S Includes borrOWing via FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percentchange